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The Ne the rl ands1
1 In tro duc ti on
There is a n abunda nc e of o bserv ations sho wi ng tha t indi viduals do not alw a ys pursue
sel f- i n tere st: P eop l e riski ng thei ro wn l ife to rescue others, s ol di ers v olun ta ri ly go i ng to
w ar, the m an yf o r m so fc ha ri t y etc . These o bserv ations can b e m ade cons i sten tw i th
sta ndard econo m ic t he or y b y p o stulating util it y functions th at i nc lude the w ell -b e i ng of
othersi na d d i tion to the o wn on e .Y et, this only re p hrases the questi on o f wh y indi vidu-
als b eha v ei n this w a y . Instead of ex pl aining altrui st i c b eha v ior, one no w has to ex pl ain
wh y p eople s om e tim es ha v ea l truistic prefe rence s. I t is this q uestion tha t w ew an tt o
add re ss .
W e a dopt a n ev olutionary a pproa c ht o i n v estiga te whet he ra l truism m a yh a v ee v olv ed
in h um a ns thro ugh a pro c ess of na tural or cultural sel ecti on . F or m al ly , the degree of
altruism is expre s sed b y a prefere nce pa ram e ter de sc ribing ho wm uc ha ni nd i vi d ual cares
for the success of o thers. T he ra nge of p os si ble para m ete rs i ncludes pure sel f-in te rest
as th e sp e cial cas e wh e re an ag e n t’s ob jec tiv ei s iden tic al t o hi s priv ate succ ess . In
the i n teracti o n with others, eac hp l a y e rr a t i o nall y sel ects a strategy to m axim ize his
prefe rence s . As a result, i ne quil ibri um eac hp l a y e r’s e￿ec tiv e succe ss d e p ends on the
altruisti c attitude s of all the in v ol v ed pla y ers. This all o w s us to com pare the su c cess of
pla y ers with di￿eren t pre ferenc e pa ram e ters. In a n ev oluti o nary en v ironm en t, pla y ers
with a hi g her exp ec ted succe s s are less l ik el yt ob e e l im inated. Si nc e succ ess is re lated
to prefe rence s, w e c an st u dy the question of whether ev ol ution fa v o rs altr ui stic o r sel￿sh
attitudes. A ltruism i ss a i dt ob e e v ol utiona ri ly stable if i t survi v es ev ol utiona ry sel ecti on .
Instead o f studyi n g dire ctl y the ev olution o f b eha vi or, w hi c hi s th e us ual appro ac hi n
e v olutionary bi ol og y
1
and i ne v oluti o nary ga m et h e o ry (see ,f o ri n stance, H am m erste in
and Selte n (19 94 )), w e consider ra ti o nal b e ha v ior for giv en pre ferenc es. These pre fer-
enc es d e term ine the pl a y e rs ’ b e hav ior a nd thei r e￿ecti v es u c cess via thei r e￿ect on the
outco m e of stra te gi ci n teracti o ns. By assu m ing ra ti o nal b eha vi o r an d a pp l yi n g the c on -
ce pt of ev ol ut ion ary sta bi li t y (see Ma y na rd Sm ith (19 82)) to p re fere nc es ra ther than to2
stra te gi es, w ee ndo genou sl y determ ine prefe rences. Our appro ac ht h us o￿ ers a w a yo f
e n d o g e nizi ng indiv idual ob je ctiv e functions, whic hn e oc l a ssic a l theory u suall y tre at s a s
ex o genous .
2
Our ana l ysis o f i nd i vi d ual in teracti on s y iel ds t w o insi gh ts: First, a com parison of
the in teracti on b e t w e en a l truists and th e in te ra c tion b et w een egoists re v e al s that the
altruists a c hie v e a higher m aterial pa y o ￿ than the ego i s ts. Th i si ss ob e c a use a l truisti c
prefe rence si n ternali ze s om e exte rn al itie s in the ga m eb e t w e en the pl a y e rs . Sec o nd, when
an altr u i st in te ra c ts with an ego i st , t he al truist’s m ateri al p a y o￿ i sl o w er than the ego -
ist’ s pay o￿ . This ￿nding i si nl i ne wit h the con v en ti o nal vie w tha t altrui stic p re fere nc es
reduce the i ndivi dua l ’s succe s s, whil e at the sam et im e incr ea si ng the o pp o ne n t’s succ ess .
Th e second re su l ti s o fte n used as an a rgum e n t that altrui s m canno t p ossibly ev ol v e
b y natural sel ecti on . Y et ,t h i s a rgum en td o e sn o td i rec tly address e v oluti o nary c on -
s i d e r a t i on s . F or th e pro cess of n atural s e lec tion, th e re lev an t questi o n is whet he ra n
e g o i s tic m utan tf a c ing a p opulation o f altrui s t si sm ore succe ss ful th an the a l truists
am on g them se lv es. Al truism wil lb ee v ol utiona ri ly stable i f a n ego i st in the in teraction
with an a l truist rec eiv e sal o w e rm ateri al p a y o￿ than a n altrui st. I n o ur m o del, this
dep ends o n the strategic dep endenc eb e t w e en the pla y ers. A ltruism t u rns out to b e
ev olutionarily s table o nl y if the ga m ee x hi bits stra te gi c com pl em e n taritie si n the sense
of B ulo w et. a l . (19 85 ) . This s ugg e sts that pre ferenc es m a yb ec on text dep enden t. Situ-
ationa l f ac t or s m a y dec ide whether i nd i vi d uals are m otiv ated b y altrui s m or self-i n tere st .
A sF rank( 1 98 7, 1 988 ) and Sc hell ing (1 978 ), o ur ana l ysis em p hasize s the strategic rol e
of p re fere nc es a nd em ot i o ns. A pl a y e r’s prefere nces a ￿ec t n ot on l y his o wn e quil ibri um
b eha vior but a l so the b eha vi or o f h i s op pon e n t. Dep ending o n the t y p eo fi n teracti on ,
this e￿ect can b e e ither b ene￿ci a l or ha rm ful for a pla y er w i th al truistic pref erence s. As
a result, natura l sele cti on f a v ors altr ui sm i n th e case of stra te gi c com pl em e n ts but no t in
the cas e of s trategic substitutes. The stra te gi cr o l e o f prefe rences distinguishes o ur a p-
proa c h from al terna ti v ee x plana ti o ns of altrui sm that rel yo n‘ kin s e lec tion’ a rgum en ts .3
These argum en ts s ho wt h a t e v oluti o n can sus tai na l truism b e t w ee n geneti call yl ink ed
indi viduals (see, e .g. Bergstro m a nd Sta rk (199 3)).
Th e follo wi ng sec tion descri be s the in teraction b et w e en i nd i vi d uals and de￿nes thei r
succe s s resulti ng from thei r b eha vi or. Se ction 3 studies the in teraction b et w ee ne g oisti c
pla y ers an d di sc us ses e￿ cie ncy i m pli cations . Altrui stic pre ferenc es are i n tro duce di n
secti on 4 , wh e re w ea l so study the im pact of pref erence s o n the equi li br i um outcom e.
Sec tion 5 in v esti g ates the ev olutionary stab i li t yo fa l truism .I n s e cti o n6w ee xtend our
concl us i o n s t oam o re general fram e w or k . Fi na l ly , sec tion 7 con c ludes a nd discusses
ex tensions .
2 Su cces s and Beha vior
Co nsi de r a p opulation whos e m em be rs i n teract with eac h o the ri n pairs. A ll m em b ers are
ide n tic a l a nd s o the in te ra c tion b et w een a pair of i ndivi dua l si s descr ib ed b y a sym m etri c
ga m e. I n this ga m e , one of the pl a y e rs is lab ell ed as pla y er 1 a nd the o t he ri sl abe l led as
pla y er 2 . Pla y er 1’s c hoice of action i s denoted b y x ￿ 0; pl a y e r2c ho o ses s om e action
y ￿ 0: Ea c h pla y er’s m ateri al p a y o￿ or ev ol ut i on ary succe ss dep ends o n the join t acti on s
( x ; y) ac c o rd i ng to
U
1
(x; y ) ￿ x(ky + m ￿ x ) ; U
2
( x; y ) ￿ y (kx + m ￿ y) ; (1)
where the para m eters k an d m a re assum ed to satisfy the restri ction
￿ 1 <k <1 and m> 0 : (2)
The function U
i
(￿)d o e s no t nec ess ari ly repre se n tp l a y e r i ’s su b j ecti v e uti li t y o r his pref-
ere nces. In the i n te ra ct ion with his opp onen t, pla y er i se eks t om axim ize the util it y
V
i
( x; y ): The functi on V
i
( ￿ ) ; wh i c hm a y di￿er from U
i
(￿ ); wi ll b e de￿ned in Secti on 4.
The param etri c sp eci ￿cation of pa y o ￿s all o w s us to deriv e a closed f or m s ol ution for
the pl a y er s ’ equi li br i um succe ss . Assum ption (2) to gether wi th t he spe c i￿cation of the
util it y functi on V
i
( ￿ ) in Sec tion 4 g uara n tees that the equi li br i um of the g am eb e t w e en
the t w o indiv iduals is uni que. A lso, the c o nstrain ts x ￿ 0 and y ￿ 0 a re nev er bi nd i ng .4
The sp ec i￿cati o n of m at e rial pa y o￿ s i n (1 ) is su￿ci en tl y general to ill ustra te the m ain
arg um en ts o f our ana l ysis; w e co nsi der m ore g e nera l pa y o￿ functi o ns in secti on 6 .
B y ( 1 ), eac hi nd i vi d ual’ s succ ess dep ends n ot o nl y o n his o w n acti o n but also on the
c ho i ce of the o the rp l a y er. If k> 0 the gam ee xhibit s pos i tiv e exte rna l iti es be c a use a
higher a c tion b yp l a y e ri i nc reases the succe ss of p l a y er j: Negativ e externali tie s oc cur
if k< 0 :The sim pl est e xam ple i s a pro ducti on ga m e with externali tie s , where x an d y
denote the pl a y e rs ’ e￿o rt or i np ut de cisi o ns. Pla y er 1’s su c cess can then b e de￿ned as the
di￿ere n c eb e t w een hi s output, x (ky +m ) ; a nd his (q u adratic) e ￿ ort cost, x
2
: E q uiv alen tly ,
in the pre se nce o f cos t exte rna l iti es, hi s o utput is mx and his c os t i s x ( ky ￿ x ) : P o siti v e
pro ducti on e xternali tie sm a y not only result from t ec h nological in te rdep e ndence; the y
also o c cur when a gen ts sha re the join t outp ut of thei r indivi dua l pro d uc tion e ￿ orts or i f
thei r e￿orts con tribute to the p ro duction of a publi c go o d. N eg ati v e cost ext erna l iti es
arise na turall y when th e p l a y e rs e xploit a c om m on re s ource .
Sev eral autho rs ha v e used ev ol utiona ry a rgum e n ts to e xplain the m ark e tb e ha vior
of ￿rm s (s e e, e.g. P e nro se (195 2) a nd Win ter (19 71 )). W e can a pply o ur app r oa c ht o
t h e s tandard m od e ls of ol i g opol isti cc om p eti tion b yi den ti fyi ng a ￿r m ’s succ ess with its
pro￿ ts: Pla y er 1 a nd 2 are enga ged i na s y m m e tric duop oly g am e with hete ro gene ou s
pro ducts a nd l inear d e m and functi o ns. In a C ournot m ark et, the acti on s x and y w ould
repre se n t the ￿rm s’ quan ti t yc ho i ces. Their pro duc ts are im pe rfect subs t itutes for all
k 2 (￿1; 0) a nd their pri ces are m + ky ￿ x an d m + kx ￿ y: In a B ertrand m ar k et, the
￿rm sw ould com pe te b yc ho os i ng price s x and y; re spe c tiv ely . They fa c e the dem and
functi on s m + ky ￿ x and m + kx ￿ y and the ir pro d uc ts a re i m p erfec t subs ti tutes for all
k 2 (0; 1) : Th us , the pa y o￿ s in (1 ) can b e in terprete d as the Co urnot or Ber tra nd pro ￿ts
in a sym m et ric duo p oly m ark et with zero pro ducti o n costs .
As a b enc hm ar k ,w ed e ￿ne a sym m etric o pti m um b y acti on s ( ^ x; ^ y ) that m axim iz e the
pla y ers’ join t succ ess, i. e.






( x; y )]: (3)5
Sinc e ￿1 <k <1 ;this op t im um is w e ll-de￿ne d and determ ine db y the nec essa ry and
su￿ci en t ￿rst-o rder c o nditi on s x =( 2 ky + m ) = 2a n d y =( 2 kx + m ) = 2 : T her efore,
^ x =^ y =
m
2 ￿ 2 k
an d U
1
(^ x; ^ y )= U
2
(^ x; ^ y )=
m
2
4 ( 1 ￿ k )
: (4)
T ypi call y , the presence o f exte rna l iti es prev en ts the pla y ers from r ea c hing the o utc om e
(^ x; ^ y ) thro ugh i ndivi dua l pre ferenc em axim izati on . In the fo l lo wi ng t w os e ctions, w e
in v e st i ga te the re lation b et w een altrui st i c prefe rences an d this ine ￿ci ency .
3 Eq uilibrium w ith Egoistic Preferenc es
An ego i stic pla y er see ks to m ax im i ze his pri v a te succe s s. He sho ws no con c ern f o r the
succe s s o f his pa rtne r. Tha t is, pla y er i acts e g oisti ca l ly i fh i s sub jec tiv e util it y satis￿es
V
i
( x; y ) = U
i
(x; y ): Sinc e thep l a y ers i n teract non- c oo pe r at i v e ly , eac h of them c ho oses
his action ta k ing the a c tion o f the other as gi v en. Th i sr e su l ts in a c tions ( ~ x ; ~ y ) that
constitute a N as h eq ui li brium of the g am e. A ccordingly ,








( ~ x; y ): (5)
The pla y ers’ b est- re sp ons e func tions are g i v en b y
~ x =0 : 5(ky + m ) ; ~ y =0 : 5( kx + m ) : (6)
T oc hara c teriz e the t yp e o f s trategic in t erdep endence ,i tw i l l b e useful to e m plo yt h e ter-
m i no l o g yo fB u l o w et. al. (19 85): F or k> 0 ; the reaction func tions a re up w ards sloping
andt h e ga m e exhi bi ts st r a tegi c com pl em e n ta ri tie s. If k< 0 ; the gam ee xhibi ts strate-
gic s ubsti tu te s be caus e the rea c tion functi o ns are do wn w a rds sl o ping. F o r insta nc e, the
Co urnot ga m e discussed in Se ction 2 induce s strategic s ubstitute s , whil e the Bertrand
ga m e leads to stra te gi c com ple m en ts .
Th e pl a y e rs’ reactions g ene ra te the f ol lo wing e quil ibri um a c tions and pa y o ￿s:





(~ x; ~ y )=U
2
(~ x; ~ y )=
m
2
(2 ￿ k )
2
: (7)6
A sar e su l t U
i
(~ x; ~ y ) <U
i
(^ x; ^ y );i =1 ; 2 ;unle ss k =0 : The reaso n i s, of course, that
with egoistic b e ha v ior eac hp l a y er ign ores the i m pact of his a c tion o n the other pl a y e r’s
succe s s. This ki nd of exte rna l it y expl ai ns w h y~ x =~ y<^ x =^ y if k> 0 ; and ~ x =~ y> ^ x =^ y
i f k < 0 :
U s u al ly , on e de￿nes e v oluti o nary s tabil it y i n term s of stra te gi es rather than
prefe rence s.
3
T he de￿ni tion of a n ev ol utiona ri ly sta bl e s trategy im pli es i m m e diately that
this stra te g y co nsti tutes a sym m etri c Nash e quil ibri um . In fact, if a sym m etr ic N as h
e q ui l i b rium is ‘stri ct’ in the s e ns e that the pla y ers’ b est re s p ons e s are uni que, then the
eq ui li brium stra t eg y i s also ev olutionarily stable. By (6) the eq ui li brium ( ~ x; ~ y )i s stri ct
and , since ~ x =~ y; it i ss y m m e tric . Therefore, o nl y the s trategy ~ x is e v oluti o naril y stable.
Tha t is, only the e g oistic b eha vi or ~ x =~ ysurviv es s e le ction o f the m ost succ essful s trat-
egy .T o explai n the e v oluti o n o f altrui sm , on e has to ad opt a n alternativ em e tho d. This
is do ne b y our ‘ indire ct’ ev olutionary appro ac h, whic h appli es the ide ao f e v olutionary
sel ecti o n to pre ferenc es i nstea d of s trategie s.
4 Altruis tic P refere nces
Ap l a y e ri s alt ru i stic when his prefe rence s re￿e ct so m e concern for th e o the rp l a y e r’s
succe ss . W e descri b e suc h pre ferenc es b y
V
1
(x ;y )= ￿U
1
( x; y )+( 1￿￿ ) U
2




( x; y )+( 1 ￿ ￿ ) U
1
( x ;y ) : (8)
Ac cordingly , the co nc ern tha t pla y ers 1 a nd 2 ex pr e ss for the other pla y er’s success is
repre s e n ted b y the w ei gh ts 1 ￿ ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿; resp e ctiv el y .I f ￿; ￿ < 1 ; the pla y ers a re said
to b e altrui st i c . This form ul ation o f altruism ha s b ee ne m pl o y ed alre ad y b y Edgew orth
(18 81 , p. 53 ), w ho call ed the v al ues (1 ￿ ￿)=￿ and (1 ￿ ￿ )=￿ the ‘ co e￿ ci en ts of e￿ecti v e
sym path y’ .I n w hat follo ws, w e restri ct these c oe ￿ cie n ts to l ie i n the unit i n terv al b y
consideri ng only v alues o f ￿ an d ￿ suc h that

























































































(~ x; ~ y )
























Fi g ure 1: Al truism a nd Equil ibri um Be ha v ior
Tha t i s , eac hp l a y e ri s tak en to w ei g h his o wn succe ss at l east as m uc ha st h e opp o nen t’s
succe ss . W em ai n tain the as sum pti o n of com m on kno wledge to a nalyse the gam eb e -
t w een the ￿￿ an d the ￿ ￿pl a y e r. This m eans, no t only the m at e rial pa y o ￿s b ut also the
prefe rence pa ram e ters ￿ an d ￿ are c om m only k no wn b y the p l a y e rs. W e wil ld i scuss the
signi￿cance of this a ssum ption later in this secti o n and i n sec tion 7.
Al truismi n￿ ue nces the strategic in te ra c tions b et w een the pla y ers ev en thoug h i td o e s
n ot di rectl y a ￿ect thei rs u c cess as de ￿n e db y (1). Al truism ha s a n indi rect i m pa c t on the
pla y ers’ succe ss si nce thei r b eha vi o r dep ends on the pa ram e ters ￿ and ￿: Ea c hp l a y er
seek s tom a x im ize hi s sub je ctiv e prefe rence s so that
x
￿














;y ) : (1 0)
F rom th e ￿rst-o rde rc o nditi o ns fo r prefe rence m axi m i za t ion w e can de riv et h ep l a y e rs ’








Al truisti c pre ferenc es shift a pla y er’s b est resp onse func tion up w ards if k> 0 ; an d do wn-
w ards if k< 0 : F or k> 0 ; thi si si ll us t ra te di nF igure 1. The ￿gure de pi cts pl a y e r 1’s b est8
resp o nse for gi v en para m eter v alues ￿ = 1 and ￿< 1 : Si m i larly ,p l a y er 2’s b e ha vior is
repre se n ted f or t w o di￿eren tv alues of ￿: Th e in tuiti on f o r thi s e￿ect is that an a l truisti c
pla y er i n ternali zes, at le a st partiall y , the e xternali t yo fh i s b eha vi o r o n the other pl a y e r’s
succe s s. This induce sh i m to sele ct a higher action with p o sit iv ee x terna l iti es an d a lo w er
action w i th n e g ati v ee xternali ties.
Th e e quil ibri um o f the ga m eb e t w ee nt w op l a y e rs with prefe rence para m ete rs ￿ and
￿; resp ecti v e ly ,i s g i v e nb y
x
￿
( ￿; ￿ )=





( ￿; ￿ )=




In Figure 1 the e quil ibri um i s dete rm ine d as the in te rsecti o n o f the pla y ers’ b est re-





)i s reali zed a s ￿; ￿ < 1: A s the ￿g ure i ll u strates, this o utc om ei sc los e r to the
optim um ( ^ x; ^ y ) than the ego i st i c equi li brium ( ~ x; ~ y ):
F or what fo l lo ws, it i si m p o rtan tt on o t i ce that ea c h pla y er’ s pref erence pa ram et er
not only a ￿ects his o wn equi li br i um b eha vi or b u t al so the opp onen t ’s c hoic e o f acti on .
Sinc e the pl a y e rs a re enga ged i n a n on-co op e ra ti v eg a m e, eac h o f them bases his dec ision
on his kno wle dg e a b ou t the other pl a y e r’s attitudes. F oll o wing Sc he lli ng (1 978 , p. 2 29 ),
who c al ls \ a b e ha vioral prop ensit y[ ... ]s t r a tegi ci fi t in￿uence s others b y a￿ecti ng thei r
ex pe c ta ti on s, "w e ref er to the de pe nd e nce of x
￿
on ￿ an d o f y
￿
on ￿ a s the ‘strategic’
e￿ec t of altrui sm . This s t ra te gi ce ￿e ct is c o nsisten tw i th the ps y c hological ev idence that
indi viduals do no t a c tu n i form ly ag ainst other i nd i vi d uals; rather, they condition thei r
o wn b eha vi o r o n th e attitude s o f tho se with w hom they in te ra c t.
4
Th i s, of c o urse, pre-
sum es that they can a n tic ipate the attitudes of their opp onen t. Prefe rence sc an h a v e
a strategic e ￿e ct o nl y if, a t l eas t to s om ee xten t, they are c om m unic at e dt o the other
pla y er. In this sense, our an aly si s refers to en v ironm en ts where the pla y ers le a rn ab out
eac h other b efore c ho o sing the ir a c tions . I n fact, as F rank (1 98 7, 19 88) arg ue s, m an y
obs e rv ab l ep h y si cal s y m ptom sm a y pro vi de som e indic at i on of a p e rso n’ s a ￿ect iv ec on -
diti o n. These s y m ptom s inc lude p os ture , the rate of respi ra ti o n, the pitc h a nd ti m bre
of th e v oic e, and f ac ial m us c le tone a nd ex press i on . A lso, he rep o rts so m e exp eri m e n ta l9
ev idence tha t, e v e n o n the basis o f b ri ef e nco un ters in v olvi ng strang e rs , s ub je cts are
adept a t predi cting the b eha v ior of thei r opp onen t (see F ra nk (19 88), c h. 7).
Using (1 2), w e can d e term ine the di recti o n of the stra te gi c e￿ec t. As @x
￿
= @ ￿ < 0
and @y
￿
=@ ￿ < 0 fo r all k 6=0 ; the opp onen t’ se q uil ibrium acti o n will b e the higher the
m orea l tru i stic al ly i ncl ined a pla y er i s. In the c a se o f p os i tiv ee xternali tie s( k> 0) ;
there fo re , the s trategic e￿ec th a sap o s i tiv ei m pact on the a l truistic pla y er’ ss u c cess. Ef-
fec tiv el y ,t h e op p onen tw i ll c ho ose a m or e f a v orab l e acti on b e c a use h e in teracts with an
altruist. If k< 0 ;ho w ev er, th e stra te gi c e￿ect t u rns out to b e disadv an ta geous : P l a y er
i’ s altrui sm induces pla y er j to c ho o se a hi gh e r acti o n and thi s reduc es pl a y e r j ’ s succ ess .
Ca n a p o pulati o n o f altrui st i c pla y ers reac h a higher l ev e l of succ ess than e g oisti cp l a y-
ers? W e ans w e r thi sq ue stion b yc o nside ring the outcom eo f t he i n ter a cti on b et w een t w o
pla y ers with i de n ti ca l prefe rence param ete rs . A c om p ari s on with the egoistic o utc om e
a n d t h e s y m m e tri c o pti m um sho ws that, for a l l1 = 2 <￿<1 ;
~ x= ~ y <x
￿
( ￿ ; ￿ ) = y
￿
( ￿ ; ￿ ) < ^ x =^ y; if k> 0; (1 3)
~ x = ~ y> x
￿
( ￿ ; ￿ )=y
￿
( ￿ ; ￿ )> ^ x=^ y; if k< 0 : (1 4)
Al truism s hi fts the eq uil ibrium o utc om ec l os e rt o w ar d s optim al b e ha vior. I nf a c t, i n the
ex trem ec as e ￿ =1 = 2 the pla y ers’ eq uil ibrium acti on s be c om e iden t ical to the sym m etri c
optim um .T h i s has the fol lo wing i m pl ication fo r the pl a y er s ’ succ ess.
Prop osit ion 1: L et k 6=0 : The n a p opulation of altruistic players r e aches a hi g her le ve l
of su c c e ss than a p opul a ti o no fe goists, i.e. U
i






( ￿; ￿ ));i=1 ; 2 ; if
￿ < 1:
P r opos i tion 1 sh o ws that altrui s m pro duce sm ore e￿c ien to u t c om es.
5
Y e t, thi sd o e s
not m ean that an a l truisti ca l ly inc line da c to r is m ore s uc cessful th an a pla y er w ho acts
on ego i stic princi ple s . Inde ed, the con v en ti o nal vie w is that altr ui stic b e ha vior re du c es
the actor’s succ ess wh i le enhan c ing the succ ess o f o thers. The f ol lo wing result, whic h10
foll o w s from L e m m a 7 in the App endi x, con￿rm s this i n tui tion.
Prop osit ion 2: L et k 6= 0: Then in the in ter ac tion b e twe en two players, the
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( ￿; ￿ ) ;y
￿
( ￿; ￿ )); for al l ￿<￿ :
A n a ltrui st i sw i ll ing to re du c e his o wn succe ss i n order to inc reas e the succe ss o f
others. There fo re , one m igh t concl u de tha t sel f-in te rest ha s a higher survi v al v al ue
than a l truism .Y e t , P r opos i tion 2 presen ts only o ne cons i deration tha t is im p ortan t for
ev olutionary sel ecti on . A s P r opo si tion 1 indi cates, a p opulation consisting l a rgel yo f
altruists wil l p erform b ette r than a p o pul at i o n of e g oists. An eg oi st w i thin a p opulation
ofa l tru i sts m a yh a v ea r elativ el yl o w exp ec ted s uc cess b ec a use the altruists a m on g
t h e m se lv es attain a higher l ev el of succ ess than the ego i st ag ainst the altrui sts . In fact,
ev e n an al truist in te ra c ting with a n ego i st m ay ha v e a higher s uc cess than an e g oist w ho
faces ano the r ego i st. I n the foll o wing secti on w e wil l address th e issue of ev olutionary
prefe rence sel ect ion b y usi ng the concept of e v oluti o nary sta bi li t y .
5 The Stabilit y of Altruis m
Ca n altrui sm em e r g e i na ne v ol utiona ry pro cess w he re only the m o st succ ess ful pla y ers
surviv e? B y Prop ositi o n 1, a p opulation of altrui st s i s m ore s uc cessful t ha n a pop u l a-
tion of ego i s ts. But t hi sd o e s no t nece ss aril ym ean that altrui sm i se v oluti o naril y stable.
When a n eg oi st i n v ades a p opulation of alt ru i sts an d p e rfo r m s b etter tha n his opp o nen ts ,
then ego i sm w i ll spread o ut an d el im inate a l truistic b eha vi or i n the pro c ess of ev ol ut i on .
Con v e r se ly , an altrui st m a ys u c cessfull yi n v ad e a p o pul at i on of e g oi st s i f h ed o e sb e t t er
than the e g oists aga i ns t e ac h other.
T o study the ev ol utiona ry s tabil it y of altrui sm ,w ee m plo y the ‘i nd i rec t’ e v oluti on -
ary appro ac h , whic hi ss c hem at i cally presen ted i nF i g ure 2 . In th e prev ious s e cti on w e
studied the eq uili brium b eha vi o r of t w op l a y e rs wi th pref erence p aram ete rs ￿ an d ￿; re-
sp e ctiv el y . This equi li brium determ ines eac h pla y er’ s succe ss . I na ne n vironm e n tw h e re11
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Figure 2: Ev ol utiona ry Se lec tion of Prefer ences
ev olutionary se lec tion fa v ors the m ore succe s sful pl a y er s , pla y ers w i th l o w er m ateri al
pa y o￿s wil lb e co m e exti nct. I n thi sw a y , prefere nces a re sel ecte d for the ir capa c it yt o
generate m ateri al pa y o￿ s.
T o com pl ete our analysi s, w ei n v esti g ate whether a m on om orphic p opu l at ion of pla y ers
with para m eter ￿
￿
is i m m un e a ga i nst in v ading m utan t pla y ers with a d i ￿e ren t pre ferenc e
para m eter. In wha t fo l lo ws, R(￿; ￿ )d e no te sa p l a y e r’s succe ss w he n he has the altrui sm
para m eter ￿ whil eh i s opp onen t ha s the pa ram ete r ￿: Sinc e the i n ter a cti on b et w e en th e se
pla y ers results in the equi li brium (x
￿
(￿ ; ￿ ); y
￿
(￿; ￿ )); w e get






( ￿; ￿ )): (1 5)
The m uta n t sp ace M =[ 1 = 2 ; 1] is the set of all p ossible v al ues for the para m eters ￿
and ￿: Th e f un c tion R(￿) to gether with the s e t M de￿nes a s y m m e tric ev olutionary
ga m e. This gam ea l lo ws us to study the ev ol utiona ry sta bi li t y o f a prefere nce pa ram et er
b y using th e co nc ept o f ev olutionaril y stable strategies (ESS, s e eM a ynard S m ith (19 82 )).
De￿ni tion: A prefe rence param ete r ￿
￿





) ￿ R (￿; ￿
￿
) fo r all ￿ 2 [1= 2; 1]; an d (1 6)
R(￿
￿




)=R ( ￿; ￿
￿
): (1 7)
Th e s e conditi on s c a pture the i dea tha t a p opulation with p aram ete r ￿
￿
c a nnot b e
in v ad e db ya s m al lm inorit y with d e vi an t pa ram e ter ￿ :A ccording to the ￿rs t requi re-12
m e n t, a n e v oluti o naril y sta bl e para m eter ￿
￿
i sa b e st reply a ga i ns t i tsel f. A n y ￿￿m utan t
in v a di ng a so ci et yo f￿
￿
- p l a y e rs can not b e m or e su c cessful than the m em be rs o f the so -
ci et y .I f s e v eral param ete rs are eq ua l ly succ ess f ul , t he se cond c o ndi tion r ul es o ut that
an alte rna ti v e b est repl y ￿ 6= ￿
￿
can spread o ut in the p o pul at i o n: Sinc e ￿
￿
is b ett er
ag ainst ￿ th an ￿ itsel f, ￿ wi ll b e e li m inated a s so o n as i t b ecom e sm ore freque n tw i thin
the p o pulati on .
Th e ESS-concept o ri gi na te s from biolog y and i s bas e d on the i dea that hi g her suc-
ce s s re￿e cts an a dv an tag e in repro duci ng . I n an econo m ic c on text, of cours e ,s u c cess is
m ostly iden ti￿ed w i th m onetary pa y o￿ s. One can dire ctly ext end the i dea of ev olutionary
sta bi li t y to this con text when m onetary pa y o￿ i sa n i m p orta n td e term inan tf o rr e pr o-
ducti v e success. I ndeed, so m ee m piri cal evi dence indic at e s tha t, o v er the m ore rece n t
h um a n histo ry , indiv idua l w ealth h as b ee n p o sit iv ely re lated to the n um b er of survi ving
o￿ spring.
6
F o r the ec o nom i st, ho w ev er, the so c ial m e c hanism s of learning a nd im itation
are pro bably m or e i m por t an t than th e g e ne tic m ec ha ni sm :E v ol ution ary sel ecti on o ccurs
b ecause su c cessful b eha vi o ral attitudes tend to b e i m it a ted. I nd i vi d ual traits that y ie ld
lo w er pa y o￿ s wil l, therefore, b e dri v e n o ut b ym ore su c cessful trait s. I n thi sw a y ,i m it a-
t i on m a y induce a pro ce s s that resem bl es na tural s e lec tion or the ‘ s urv iv al of the ￿ t test’.
7
W e ￿rst a pply the ESS -c o nce pt to the c as e k> 0 ; where the pla y ers’ i n teracti on s
ex hi bit strategic c om plem en tarit ies. By Lem m a s4- 6i n the App endix w eg e t the fol-
lo wi ng result.
Prop osit ion 3: L et k> 0 : Then ￿
￿
= (2 ￿ k )= 2 is t he uniq ue ev olution ar ily stabl e
pr efe r en c ep ar amete r .
As ￿
￿
< 1; ev ol utiona ri ly sta bl ep r e fere nc es m ust e xhibi ts o m e deg re eo fa l truism .
The le v e lo fa l truism is p o siti v ely r elated to th e pa ram e ter k: A ltruism b ec om es m ore
im p ortan t when the s trategic in terdep endence b et w e en the pl a y e rs is rel at iv ely high. In
fact, k ! 1i m pli es ￿
￿
! 1= 2:13
Wh y c a na n e g oisti cm uta n t with ￿>￿
￿
n o t i n v a de a p opulation of ￿
￿
-indi viduals?
Ac tua l ly ,b y P rop o sit ion 2, s uc ha m utan t ha s a higher su c cess th an th e m em be r of the
p o pulati on wi th whom he i n teracts. Y et, the l o wp a y o￿ o f an ￿
￿
-p l a y e r ag ainst a n in-
v ad i ng m uta n ti sl ess i m p o rtan t for e v oluti o nary cons i derations. F or th e m em be rs of the
p o pulati o n the l ik el iho o d of i n te ra ct ing with the m utan ti ss m al l. Mos tl y they in teract
with e ac ho t he r a nd so, b y P r opos i tion 1 , their exp ecte d lev el of su c cess is re lativ el y
high. The pa ram ete r ￿
￿
< 1i se v olutiona r ily stable b ecause in th e gam eb e t w e en a pa i r
of ￿
￿
- indiv idua l s eac ho f t h e mg e t sal a rger m ateri al p a y o ￿ th an the e g oist a gainst an
￿
￿
-o pp o ne n t.
Al s o, th e uniq ue ness o f ￿
￿
in Prop ositi o n3i m pli es that a p opulation of ego i sts is
vul nera bl e a ga i ns t in v a sion b y altrui st i c agen ts. T hi s is so b ecause the in teraction b e-
t w een the ego i s ts results in lo wp a y o￿ s. I fa n a l truist en ters a p o pul at i o n o f egoists, his
pa y o￿ wil l b e lo w er tha n the on e of his partner. Nonethel ess, he is stil lm ore succ ess f ul
t h a n al l the o ther eg oi st s w h o ha v e an egoist as t he ir partner. This hap p ens b ecause
prefe rence sh a v eas t ra te gi ce ￿ e ct: A si tw as s ho wn i nt h ef o regoing sec tion, the a l truist
induce s h i s op pon e n tt oi ncre a se his acti on l e v el . In the c as e o f pos i tiv ee xternali tie s,
this is b e ne￿ci al a n d so h e wi ll s uc ceed i ni n v ad i n gas o c ie t yo f e g oists.
Th e l a st a rgum e n ti ndicates tha t the s i gn of k m a yb ei m p o rtan t for the ev olution
of altrui sm . In fact, the foll o wi ng result rev eals that e g oistic pref erence s are the uniq ue
ev olutionary o utcom ei n th e ca se of stra te gi c s ubstit ut e s.
Prop osit ion 4: L et k< 0 :The n ￿
￿
= 1 is the uniq ue ev o l utionarily st a bl e p r e fer en c e
p ar ame ter.
Th e pro of of thi s sta te m en t foll o ws i m m ediatel yf ro m L e m m a s4-6i n the App endix.
P r opo si tions 3 and 4 rev eal tha t the s urv iv a l of al truism dep ends on the en vi ron m en t.
It is c o nsiste n t with ev ol utiona ry sta bi li t yt h a t i ndivi dua l sb e ha v e altruisti cally i ns o m e14
situations and ego i sticall yi n others. Our sim ple e xam ple o f strategic i n teracti o ns dem on -
s t r at e s this b y the d e pe nd e nce o f ￿
￿
up on the pa ram e ter k: Whe n k< 0 ; a p opulation
of egoists wil ld e feat e n t r y of al truism .O n a v erag e the ego i sts will b e m ore succ ess f ul
t h a n an i n v ading m utan t. In fact, an altrui stic en tra n tw i ll su￿ e rf o rt w o reaso ns. Fi rs t,
his c hoice of action do e s n ot ai ma t m ax im i zi ng pri v a te succe s s. Second, as k< 0 ; the
strat e gi c e￿ect of hi s attitude turns out to b e harm ful .H is e g oisti c op pon e n tw i ll c ho ose
ah i gh e r acti on l ev e l when fa c i n g an al truist. In the presenc e o f negativ e ext erna l iti es
this lo w e rs the altrui st’s p a y o￿ .
In term s of the exam pl es di scuss e di ns e ction 2 , our ana l ysis sho w s tha t altrui sm
em erges in th e presenc e of p o siti v e pro ducti o n exter n ali tie s , in the case of output sh ar-
ing, or i na B ertrand m ark e t. Se lf-in terest i s s table in an en v ironm en t with nega ti v e
pro ducti o n exte rna l iti es, wi th com m o n reso urc e exploi ta ti o n, a nd in a C ournot m ar-
k et. The stra te gi c e￿ect of pre ferenc es e xplains w h y alt ru i sm is e v oluti o naril y sta bl e
for k > 0 ; whereas ego i sm i se v oluti o naril y stable fo r k< 0 : Whe na l truism i nduces a
harm ful reacti on b yt h e other p l a y e r, one is b ette ro ￿b ye g o i st i call ym ax im i zi ng pr i v ate
succe s s. Al truism m a ye m erge o nl yi f its s trategic e ￿e ct is b ene ￿cial. In this s i tua ti on ,
thee v oluti o naril y stab l e para m eter ￿
￿
is determ ined b y the fol lo wing tra de o ￿. On the
one han d, the altrui st reduce s his succe ss b yc ho os i ng an acti o n that re￿e cts so m ec on -
ce rn f o r the other pla y er’ s succ ess; on the o ther hand, his attitude c a uses a fa v ora bl e
reacti on b yt h e o ther pl a y e r. Th e latter e￿ect b ec om e sm or e i m p orta n t for larger v al ues
of k: Th e refore, ￿
￿
an d k ar e n e g ativ el y rel at e d.
6 AG eneraliz a tion
In the p r evi o us secti on s w eh a v ee m plo y ed the param etri cs p e ci ￿c at i o n of m ateri al pa y-
o￿ s i n equation (1) to s tudy the ev oluti o nary stab i li t yo fa l truism .F or this sp e ci ￿c at i on ,
the e quil ibri u m de￿ned b y( 1 0 ) i su n i quel y dete rm ine d s o that the functi on R ( ￿ ; ￿ )i n
( 1 5 )i su n a m biguo usly de￿ne d . Moreo v er, there is a unique pref erence param ete r ￿
￿
s at-
isfy ing c o ndi tions (16 ) and (1 7) fo r e v oluti o nary sta bi li t y .F o r general succ ess f un c tions ,15
this m a y no long e r b e the c a se. Ev en when the ev ol ut i on ary g am e in sect ion 5 i sw el l-
de￿ned, i tm a y ha pp en that the p aram ete r ￿
￿
i s no t un i que o r th at an ev oluti o naril y
sta bl e para m eter do e s not exi st. N o nethe less, w ec an e xtend ou r m ai n conclusions to a
m ore general fram ew or k .
I n t his sec tion, w ew i ll generali ze the sp e ci￿c at i on of m ateri al p a y o ￿s. As b ef o re, w e
consider a m ono m o rphic p o pul at i on of p l a y ers who in teract pairwise . The g am eb e t w e en
an yp a i r of pla y ers, sa y pla y er 1 and pl a y er 2, de term i nes t he ir ev ol utiona ry succ ess .
This i s re pr esen te db y the functi on s U
1
( x ; y ) a n d U
2
( x ; y ) ; w here x an d y a re the ac-





( y; x ) : By sym m etry , the pa y o ￿ o f a strategy is indep enden to fw h e ther the
pla y er acts i n the ro l eo fp l a y e r1o r p l a y e r2 . W e assu m e U
1
(￿; ￿) to b e stri ctl y conca v e
and t wi ce di ￿ ere n tiable .
T o c haracteri ze the in te ra c tion b et w een the p l a y e rs, w ee xtend th e te rm i n ology in
the previ ou s secti o ns to the m ore general case. L et the signs of @U
1





(x; y )=@ x@y b e consta n t for all (x; y ) ￿ 0: Th e g am ei ss a i dt oe xhibi t p o siti v e
ex terna l iti es i f @U
1
( x ;y ) =@ y > 0a n dne g ativ ee xternali tie s if @U
1
( x ;y ) =@ y < 0: The




( x; y )=@ x@ y > 0 and strategic substi-




(x ;y ) =@ x @y < 0 : W e fo cus on situations wh e re @U
1





(x; y )=@ x@ y 6= 0 for a l l( x; y ) ￿ 0:
Whenev er t w oi ndivi dua l si n te ra c t with eac h o the r, eac hp l a y e risee ks to m axim iz e
his sub je ctiv eu t i li t y V
i
(x; y ); as d e￿ne db y (8). A n equi li br ium i sap a i ro f a c tions ,
(x
￿
(￿; ￿ ) ;y
￿




) =@ x is su ￿ ci en tl y
large, the equi li brium acti o ns s atisfy x
￿
> 0a n dy
￿
>0 so th at they c an b e d e riv ed from
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( ￿; ￿ );y
￿
( ￿; ￿ ))
@y
=0 : (1 8)
T oe ns ure that R (￿; ￿ )i n( 1 5 )i sw e ll -d e ￿n e d, w e a ssum e that (1 8) ha s a u ni que solution
(x
￿
(￿; ￿ ) ;y
￿
( ￿; ￿ )):
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Th e e v oluti o nary succe ss of p r e ferenc es de p ends o n thei ri m pact o n eq uili brium b e-



















































: ( 2 0 )
The e ￿e ct d e sc rib ed b y (1 9) has the sa m ei n tuiti on as in the m or e s p e ci a l case s tudi ed
b efore. The m o re altruisti cp l a y er 1 is, i .e. the l ow er ￿ is, the m ore he tends to i n ternal-
iz e the ex ternalit yo f h i s action up o n the other p l a y e r’s uti li t y . Therefore, ￿ and x
￿
are
nega ti v ely rel at e di n g a m e s with p o si tiv ee xternali tie sa n d p o s i tiv el yr e lated i ng a m es
with nega ti v e exte rna l iti es. Eq ua ti o n (20 ) generali ze s the strategic e ￿e c td i scuss e di n
the previ ou s secti o ns. As b e fo re , altrui sm i nduces the o pp o ne n t to sel ect a hi g her ac-
tion when b oth the exte rna l iti es and the s trategic i n terdep endenc eb e t w een the pl a y e rs ’
actions ha v e the sam es i g n. But, i n the m or e ge ne ra l situation considere dh e re, altru-
ism m a y also reduce the oth e rp l a y e r’s e quil ibrium acti o n. This happ e ns in g am es w i th
stra te g i c com ple m en ts when the ex terna l iti es are nega ti v e and i ng a m e s with s tr a tegi c
subs ti tutes w he n the e xternali ties are p ositi v e.
Ho w do e s the strategic e￿ec t in￿uenc eap l a y er ’s succe ss ? Cons i der a gam ew i th
stra te gi cc om plem en ts. If the ga m e h a s po si tiv ee xternali tie s , then altrui s m induce s the
opp onen tt oc ho ose a h i gh e ra c tion lev el .C l early , thi se ￿e c ti sb e ne￿ci a l fo r the altrui st’s
succe ss si nce, in the presenc eo fp o s i tiv e exte rn al itie s, ra i sing the o the r pla y er’ s action
le v e li ncreases his o wn succ ess. Si m il ar l y ,i n a gam ew i th s trategic com ple m en ts and
nega ti v ee x ternali ties altrui sm re du c es the o pp o nen t’s acti on l ev el . Again, the a l truist
ga i ns from the strategic e ￿e ct. In ga m es with stra te gi c su bsti tutes th i sc o n c lusion is
rev ersed. F or insta nc e, i ng a m e s with strategic substitute s and neg ati v ee xternali tie s,
altruism i ncreases th e o ther pl ay er’ s acti o n. This is ha rm ful b e cau se i t creates a nega ti v e
ex terna l it y . In sum m ar y , the stra te gi ce ￿e c to f a l truism on the other pl a y er’ sb e ha vior
is b ene￿ci al i n ga m e sw i th strategic c om pl em en t s an d h ar m ful i ng a m es w i th s tr a tegi c
subs ti tutes.17
Our p re vious a nalysi s sug gests tha t altrui s m s urvi v es e v oluti o nary sel ecti o n only if i t
is as so c iated with a b ene ￿c ial strategic e ￿e c t. The fo l lo wi n g result, whic hi sp r o v e di n
t h e A pp endix , ext ends thi s concl us i o n to the m o re gene ra l e n vi ro nm en t.
Prop osit ion5 : The pr efer en c ep ar am et er ￿
￿
= 1 i s e vo l u t ion a rily stabl e onl y if the
int er act i on s b etw e en individual s ar e char acte r ize db ys t r ate gic substit utes. A p ar amete r
￿
￿
< 1 is ev olution a rily s t able on ly if t hese inte r actions inv olve str at e gi c c o mpl emen ts.
Th i s result i sw ea k er than Pro p os i tions 3 and 4 b ecause it d o es no t e s tabli sh the
ex istence or uni queness of a n ev ol ut i on ari ly s t a ble pre ferenc e param ete r. Nonethel ess, i t
sho w s tha t pure ego i sm c a nnot e v olv ei na ne n v ironm en t with stra te gi cc o m ple m en tar-
iti es. I ns u c ha ne n vi ro nm e n to n l ys o m e form of a l truism has th e p oten ti al to s urvi v e
ev olutionary se lec tion. C on v ersel y , altrui sm w i ll not survi v e the i n v as i o n of e g oisti cm u-
tan ts wheni n teracti on s e x hibit s trategic subs ti tutes. Th e ev ol ution of altruism requi res
an en v ironm en t of stra te gi cc o m plem en ts. Al to gether, on e sho ul d no t exp ec te v olution
to result in a so c iet y where indi viduals alw ay s ei ther pursue pure s e lf-i n tere st or c ar e for
the w e ll-b ei n g of o thers. I ns te ad , e v ol utiona ry a rgum en ts sugg est that these a tti tudes
wil lb ec on tingen t on the strategic i n terde p ende nc eb e t w e en i ndivi dua l b eha v iors .
7 C on clus ions
Unl ik e other ev ol utiona ry stu di es of altrui st i c b eha v ior in s trategic i n teracti o n, o ur i ndi-
rec te v oluti o nary a pproa c hd o e s not den y rati o nal deci si on m aki ng . I n pr inci ple it a l lo ws
for a n y h yp o the se s s p eci fyi ng ho w stim uli , e.g. pre ferenc es, in￿uence b e ha v ior. A p r o-
ce s s o f na tural o r cultural sele ction the n dete rm ine sw h i c h stim uli em erge i n the course
ofe v ol ution. Our study e m plo y s the us ual rationali t y ass um pt i o n so fg a m e theory to
endog e nize pre ferenc es, w hi c h neo classical theory t y picall y treats as exog e no us. In this
sense, the i ndirec te v oluti o nary ap proac h generali zes neo c las si cal theory .18
Th e m ost i m p ortan t ￿nding of our study i s tha t ev ol utiona ri ly s table altruism de-
p ends o n the t yp e o f strategic in t era c tion, a s e xpressed b y the si g ns of the de riv ativ es
of m ateri al p a y o￿ s U
i
( x; y ): Al th ough in o ur co n text a l truism a l w a ys pro duc es m ore ef-
￿ci en t outcom es, it is ev ol utiona ri ly stable only i fi t induces the in teraction pa rtner to
resp o nd fa v orably . As the e v oluti o n o f prefe rence s dep ends on thi s stra te gi c e￿ect, one
m a y ex pe c t altrui s m to m iti g ate ine￿ cie ncie so n l yw h e ni n teractions can b e c hara c ter-
iz ed a s stra te gi c com ple m en ts .
Another requi rem e n tf o r the ev ol ut ion of altr ui sm is re lated to the indiv iduals’ in-
form ation ab o ut prefe rence s. Our a naly si se m plo y s the usua l co m m on k no wl edge a s-
sum ption of ga m e theory ,w h i c hi m pl ies that the p r efere nce param ete rs ￿ and ￿ are
com m on l y kno wn. T oi ll u strate the p oss i ble im pact of i ncom ple te inform ati on , c on s i der
am o nom orphic p op ul at i on o f al truists w i th pa ram e ter ￿<1 :If no w a n ego i stic m utan t
app ears, e ac h altrui s t will c o nside r the pro babili t yo f i n teracti ng w i th the m utan ta s
n e g l i g i b l e . U nder incom pl ete inform ation, the ego i st wil l b e treated a s a n a l truist and
he wi ll earn a higher m a ter ial pa y o ￿ than his altrui st i ce ncou n ter. A s result, altrui sm
wil l b e com e vul nerab l e ag ainst ego i st ic m uta n ts .
Our ana l ysis, therefore, sugg e s ts that altrui sm i sm ore l ik el yt oe m erge in so c ieti es
where indi viduals are no t a non ym o us. F or i nsta nce , altrui sm m a y b e restricte dt or e l-
ativ es a nd cl o se fri ends. In con tras t wit h the k in-s e le ction s e le ction a rgum e n t, i n our
fram ew or k t hi s ha pp ens no t b ec a use fam i ly m em be rs a re g e ne tic al ly l ink ed but b ecause
they a re b e tter i nfo rm ed ab out eac h o the r. Nonethel ess, ev en w he n prefere nces are not
dire ctl yk no wn, a l truism m a ye v ol v ei ft he re a re signals that i ndicate a p erso n’ s attitude.
In a ddi tion to the ph ysical sym ptom sm en ti o ned b yF ra nk (19 87 , 19 88 ), for instance do -
nations to c hariti es m igh t signal altrusti c pre ferenc es. A n ego i st is l ess wil li ng th an an
altruist to don ate. If im i ta t ion is to o c o stly for t he e g oist, d onations can b ecom ea
cre dible si g nal of alt ru i sm .19
App endix
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Pro of: By de ￿n i tion,
R (￿; ￿ ) =
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Therefore, @R ( ￿; ￿ ) =@ ￿ = 0 is equi v al en tt o
￿ = [ 4 ￿ + k (2 ￿ k )] = [ 4( ￿ + k )] : (2 2)
Setti ng ￿ = ￿ = ￿
￿
a nd s olv ing the re su l ting quadra ti ce quation for ￿
￿
le a ds to the t w o
so l utions stated in the L e m m a. Q.E. D.
L e m m a 2 : T h e p ar amete r ￿ ￿ = ￿ k= 2 i s not ev olution a rily s t able .
Pro of: Si nc e R( ￿; ￿ k= 2) = m
2
= 4; ￿ ￿ = ￿k= 2s a t i s￿ e st h e ￿rs t re quire m en t of sta bi li t y .
The second requi rem e n t, R (￿ ￿; ￿ ) >R ( ￿; ￿)i se q uiv alen t to the con di tion ￿ (k +1 ) <k :
As ￿(k +1 ) > 0 ; thi si m pli es k> 0 :But then ￿ ￿<0 ; a con tradic tion. Q.E. D.
Le m m a3 : The p ar amete r ￿ ￿ =1 = 2 is n ot e vol utionarily stab le.
Pro of: Strai gh tf or w ard calc ul ations sho w tha t f or ￿> ￿ ￿=1 = 2 the requi rem e n t
R (￿ ￿; ￿ ￿) ￿ R (￿; ￿ ￿)i se quiv ale n tt o
[ k
2
+ k (2 ￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 1] = [ k ￿ 1] ￿ 0 : (2 3)
As k< 1 this is eq uiv alen tt ok
2
+ k (2￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 1 : I f k> 0 ; thi s cond i tion c a nnot hold
for ￿ c los e enoug h to 1 =2: If k< 0 ;the n (2 3) h olds fo r ￿ =1 o n l yi fk
2
+ k￿ 1 : B ut for
￿1 <k <0 one canno t ha v e k
2
+ k ￿ 1: This pro v es that ￿ ￿ =1 = 2 d o es no t s atisfy the
￿rst r equire m en to f e v ol utiona ry stabil it y . Q.E. D.
Le m m a4 : L et ￿
￿




=( 2 ￿ k ) = 2 :
Pro of: The statem en t sim ply foll o ws from the fa c t tha t b y the ￿rst requi rem e n to fe v o-




) =@ ￿ = 0 whenev er 1 =2 <￿
￿
<1 : By L e m m a20
1, thi s equali t y has e xactly t w os o l utions , ￿k= 2 and (2 ￿ k )= 2: Lem m as 2 and 3 el im i-
nate the p ossibil it y tha t ￿ = ￿ k= 2o r￿ =1 = 2 are ev ol utiona ry s table .T h i sl ea v es o nl y
the t w ov alue s ￿
￿
= 1 and ￿
￿
=( 2 ￿ k ) = 2 a s candidates fo r e v oluti o nary stabil it y . Q.E. D.
Le m m a5 : The p ar amete r ￿
￿
=( 2 ￿ k ) = 2 is ev olut io na r il y stabl e if and on ly if k> 0 :
P r o of: N o te that, b y as sum pti o n (2), ￿
￿
2 [1= 2; 1] if and only if k ￿ 0 : S trai gh tf or w ard
calc ulations sho w tha t fo r ￿
￿
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=[k ￿ 1] ￿ 0: (2 4)
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￿
) fo r ￿ 6= ￿
￿
: This pro v es that also the second re quire m en to fe v olu-
tionary s tabil it yi ss a t i s ￿ed. Q.E. D.
Le m m a6 : The p ar amete r ￿
￿
=1 is e vol utionarily stab le if and onl y if k< 0 :
P r o of: Stra i gh tfo rw ar d c al culati o ns sho w tha t f or ￿ < ￿
￿
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(1 ￿ ￿ ) ￿ 4￿k +4 ( 1￿￿ ) ￿ 0 : (2 5)
F or k 2 (0; 1 ) this condition do e s not ho l d for ￿ c lose enoug h to unit y . But for
k 2 (￿1; 0] i th o l ds fo r all ￿ 2 [1= 2; 1] so tha t the ￿rst requi rem e n to fe v olutionary





) >R ( ￿; ￿
￿
): Th e refore, al s o the sec on d r e quire m en to f e v oluti o nary stabili t yi s
sa ti s￿ed. Q.E. D.
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( ￿ ) a nd b y de￿nit ion of R(￿; ￿ ); t h e state-
m e n t of the Lem m ai s equi v al en tt oR ( ￿; ￿ ) <R ( ￿; ￿ ) ; ￿<￿ : U si ng the expre ss i o n for
R (￿ ) from L em m a 1, this i s equi v al en tt o k
2
( k + ￿ + ￿ ) > 0 :By (2 ) a nd (9 ), thi s ine qua l it y
is alw a ys sa ti s￿ e di f k 6 =0 : Q.E. D.21
Pro of of P rop ositi on 5: By (15 ) one ha s
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Supp ose th at the gam ee x hi bits s trategic c om plem en ts a nd tha t ￿
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=1 : Then ￿
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) = d ￿<0 : Th us for som e ￿<1i nt h e
nei gh b orho o d of ￿
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) <R ( ￿; ￿
￿
) ; ac on tra di ction to re quire m en t (16 ).
This pro v es that ￿
￿
= 1 on l y if the ga m e exhi bits s tr a tegi c s ubstitute s.
No w supp o se tha t the g am ee xhibi ts stra te gi c s ubsti tu t es and that ￿
￿
< 1: Th e n (8)
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) = d ￿>0 : Th us for s om e ￿>￿
￿
in the neigh b o rho o d of ￿
￿




) <R ( ￿; ￿
￿
); ac on tr a dic tion to requi rem e n t
(16 ). This pro v e s that ￿
￿
< 1 only i f the ga m e exhi bi ts s trategic co m ple m en ts. Q.E. D.22
F o otnotes
1. Note that also i ne v oluti o nary biology one often co nsi de rs the ass um pt i on of gene ti-
call y dete rm i ne d b eha v ior a s que st i o nable (s e ev an L a wic k-G o o dall (197 4)). H igher
dev el o p ed sp e ci es li k em am m als l iv ei ns u c ha c om plex a nd sto c ha sti ce n vironm e n t
that a g ene tical ly de term i ned reacti on be h a vi or to al lc i rcum stances app e a r st ob e
i m p o s sible .
2. Thee xce ptions incl ude B ec k e r (19 76), F ra nk (19 87 ) a nd, m ore rece n tly ,G ￿ uth and
Y a ari (199 2), G ￿ uth a nd Kl iem t (19 94), Hanso n and Stu art (19 90), Rab i n (19 93 ),
Rog e rs (199 4), an d W aldm an (1 994 ).
3. A strategy x
s




























4. F o rab r i ef pre se n tation o f som ee vide nc e, see Ra bi n( 19 93 ) w h o i ncorp ora te st h e se
facts b y deri ving a ‘psyc ho l og i cal g am e ’ from ba sic ‘ m ateri al ga m es’ .
5. A setti ng i n whic ha l truism induce si ne￿c ien t b eha vi or i s studied b y Lindb ec k
and W ei bull (19 88). F or a discussion of the e￿c ienc y asp e cts of a l truism , see also
F ri edm an (1 98 8).
6. See ,e . g. , Cha gno n an d Irons (1 97 9) o r B o y e r (198 9).
7. See , e.g., M ai lath (1 992 ) and Sel ten (19 91 ) fo r a disc u ssion. Bj￿ ornerstedt and
W ei bull (199 4) s ho w tha t p o pul at i o n dynam ic s based o n im itation m a y b e closel y
rel at e dt o biological dynam i cs.
8.F ri edm an (1 98 6, p. 4 2￿ ) presen ts conditi o ns g uara n teei ng a uni que equi li brium .
9. In the d e riv ation of (1 9) and (20 ) w e use the sym m etry o f the g am e and the fact
that V
i
(￿) is strictl y conca v e.23
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